Archive for February, 2011
Folsom Personal Injury Lawyer Lincoln LawyerCASE LAW STUDY
Ennabe v Manosa
12/1/10
Furnishing Alcoholic Beverages; Obviously intoxicated Minor
In April 2007, the twenty year old defendant Jessica Manosa hosted a party at her parents’ vacant rental residence. The party was publicized to friend and others by word-of-mouth, telephone, and text messaging, resulting in 40 to 60 people in attendance. The majority were under 21 years old. Earlier in the day, Jessica and her two friends combined their funds to $120 with which they purchased beer, tequila and rum. The beverages were “communal” and available without limitation to party goers. Another friend served as a bouncer, and unfamiliar guests were charged a small admission fee, allowing access to the food and drink at the party. Another $60 was raised through admissions, which was used to purchase additional beverages for the party.
Andrew Ennabe, a friend of defendant Jessica’s, was not charged an admission fee. He arrived at the party in an obvious state of intoxication and he drank more alcoholic beverages at the party. Garcia, a person unknown to Jessica was admitted to the party after he paid admission. He was also intoxicated upon his arrival and also consumed additional beverages while there. Garcia proceeded to act in a belligerent manner, and was asked to leave. Andrew and some other guests escorted Garcia to his car. In driving away, Garcia struck Andrew, who died a week later from his injuries. Garcia was convicted of a felony and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Jessica did not know Garcia and was unaware of problems he was creating. This was the only social gathering she held on the property.
Ennabe’s parents filed an action for wrongful death against defendant Jessica Manosa. She later moved for summary judgment on the grounds she was immune from liability under Civil Code section 1714 and that Business and Professions code 25602.1 was not applicable. Section 1714(b) provides that the furnishing of alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from intoxication. Subsection (c) provides that no social host furnishing alcohol may be held legally accountable for injuries to a person resulting from consumption of those beverages. (Note: On January 1, 2011, section 1714(d) will take effect, providing that a parent or adult furnishing such beverages at their residence to a person under 21 years of age may be found to be the proximate cause of injury or death resulting from such furnishing of beverages.)
Business and Professions code section 25602 was enacted to overrule three earlier appellate cases from the 1970’s establishing liability for providing liquor. The statute holds that the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of such beverages is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Section 25602.1 provides a narrow exception for selling, furnishing or giving such beverages to an obviously intoxicated minor. Causes of action may thus be asserted against any person who sells, or causes to be sold, any alcoholic beverage to an obviously intoxicated minor. (B&P code section 25602.1) The statute otherwise provides “sweeping civil immunity” from liability for injuries to third persons from the furnishing of alcohol to another. (Hernandez v Modesto Portuguese Pentecost Assn. (1995) 40 Cal.App. 4th 1274)
The phrase “causes to be sold” requires malfeasance, not acquiescence or mere inaction. The statute requires an affirmative act directly related to the sale of alcohol which necessarily brings about the furnishing of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor. (Elizarraras v L.A. Private Security Services, Inc. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 237)
The definition of “sell” or “sale” in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act defines the term as any transaction, for consideration, where title to an alcoholic beverage is transferred from one person to another. Here, plaintiffs argued to the Second District Court of Appeal that a social host who collects money from a guest for a common fund with which to purchase alcoholic beverages is a person “who sells, or causes to be sold,” an alcoholic beverage. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act defines “sell” or “sale” as “including any transaction whereby, for any consideration, title to alcoholic beverages is transferred from one person to another, and includes the delivery of alcoholic beverages pursuant to an order placed for the purchase of such beverages …” (Section 23025)
The Appellate Justices explained that the statute contemplates a transaction in which one person relinquishes title to the alcoholic beverage and another person receives title to the alcoholic beverage. Here, where defendant Jessica, acting as a social host, charged guests an entrance fee of $5 to help defray the cost of providing “communal” alcoholic beverages to guests who serve themselves, there is no transfer of title to an alcoholic beverage. It is difficult to determine which individual or individuals held title to the alcoholic beverages consumed by Garcia because Jessica, as well as her two friends, contributed the money to obtain the initial beverages. Other guests, including Garcia himself contributed additional funds to buy more alcohol. Thus, Jessica and all of her guests may be said to have provided alcoholic beverages to each other, making them all sellers and purchasers.
Under such circumstances, the Second DCA concluded it would be unreasonable to deem a sale to have occurred within the meaning of sections 25602.1 and 23025. A social host who charges guests an admission or entrance fee of $5 to help defray the costs of making alcoholic beverages available to his or her guests is not a person who “sells, or causes to be sold” an alcoholic beverage within the meaning of section 25602.1. This holding is consistent with the only other case in California addressing the issue of liability of a minor social host where money is pooled to purchase alcoholic beverages for a party.
In Bennett v Letterly (1977) Cal.App.3d 901, three minors pooled money to buy beverages and after consuming whiskey, one of the minors injured another. The appellate court upheld summary judgment against the plaintiff finding that the defendant did not “furnish” alcohol so as to violate the applicable statute. In relation to a physical object or substance, the word “furnish” connotes possession or control over the thing furnished by the one who furnishes it. Since the defendant did no more than contribute to a fund, and there is no evidence he exercised any control over the beverages once purchased, he could not be liable for furnishing or causing to be furnished an alcoholic beverage in violation of section 25658 (the predecessor statute). The plaintiffs handled the bottle of whiskey, mixed their own drinks, and served themselves. Contributing to a common fund is not equivalent to exercising control over the alcohol consumed by plaintiffs. (See, Bennett, at p. 905; see also Sagadin v Ripper (1985) 175 Cal.App.1141)
Accordingly, defendant Jessica Manosa was not, as a matter of law, a person who “sells, or causes to be sold” an alcoholic beverage within the meaning of section 25602.1. The Judgment is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to her costs on appeal.
Published with permission of Ernest A. Long ADR, a well respected mediator in Sacramento, CA.
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